Thoughtfully comprehensive and overtly pragmatic. I appreciate your even-handed approach to describing the nuances of this important subject. This coup could have affected all of us in very real and severe ways, and still may.
Great piece! I am not sure Prigozhin's little endeavour has necessarily been a coup though. I am not an expert on coups specifically, but I would expect the necessary conditions of an event to be considered a coup to include the aim of toppling the leader. Of course, one of the defining traits of the Russian political system is its opacity and everything we can assume about Prigozhin's motives is speculation. This time though I think a stronger case can be made about Prigozhin acting defensively (the last months have been a constant chipping away at his powers as Wagner's leader both by Putin and the MoD) than offensively (his experience as a Kremlin insider allows him to estimate his chances in toppling Putin with some degree of accuracy. They were very low precisely because of many of the reasons you argue).
My case goes like this: if you extrapolate the current situation to other instances in which Putin has had to deal with overreaching oligarchs (e.g. Khodorkovsky), you can see the M.O. First, they take over the oligarch's business, then they move on to the punishment (murder, imprisonment...). Along the way they smear the target's reputation.
In that context from Prigozhin's PoV it makes sense to try to leverage the Wagner group before he loses control over the mercenaries. For power reasons, but also purely economical, Wagner is a very lucrative asset for Prigozhin. By launching a "freedom march", Prigozhin enters in an open (and very public) wrestle with the Kremlin in a very inconvenient time for the state, and specifically, for Putin. His myth is that of the one who ended the mob violence and street terror that the Yeltsin years brought upon the country. Every second of instability is chipping away at the legitimacy that steams from that. I do not think this can be overstated, any potential support for Putin, or his war from anyone in Russia requires that things at home are as peaceful and predictable as possible.
Therefore, Prigozhin assumes he will get away with keeping the Wagner group if he makes enough noise because Putin has to stop it on its tracks while avoiding violence—so it does not remind people of what is it like having people shooting each other on the streets.
The consequences (so far) for Prigozhin and the wagnerites have been somewhat mild. They were not met with force while moving towards Moscow and even now, seems like Prigozhin may be able to keep Wagner from Belarus. No one knows for sure. But the fact that Prigozhin spoke yesterday and Putin spoke twice already and there have been no mentions about what's going to happen with the mercenaries is at least, interesting. Of course they *can* join the Army, but they can also not as per what is public so far.
Of course, all this is merely a caveat, but I have always found that in thinking about Russia the capo di capi analogy is the one that reflects the reality the best. In this case (in which we lack key info) if we assume that that is how oligarchs perceive Putin, Prigozhin's actions (and words) make more sense. He was acting upon a beef that could go his way (against some other capos of the regime) rather than moving against the don himself. Which was a move that was almost guaranteed to fail.
Yes, it's impossible to know how to classify this properly. Many political violence experts might classify it as a mutiny, but it's very much in a grey area. It's impossible to know what his real intentions were.
In your wheelhouse, Brian. Well stated, clear, and not overreaching. I believe this mutiny/coup attempt/power play by Prigozhin will be a gift that keeps on giving. Perhaps the most damaging thing Evgeny Viktorovich did to Vladimir Vladimirovich was telling the truth about the endemic corruption as the reason for the invasion of Ukraine. It was about looting and plundering Ukrainian resources to satisfy the thirst of the oligarchy. Not nazis, not NATO, pure greed. Of course there would be side benefits such as squelching an emergent and vibrant democracy next door and feeding the vanity of the Chekist in chief as being oh so smart.
But what does your work say about dictators who overreach with foreign adventures? At every step of the way Putin has grossly miscalculated: strength and competence of his military and intelligence community, strength and resolve of Ukraine and its allies, pushing Finns and Swedes into NATO. The only tools he has is terror...missile attacks, blowing dams, and now the mining of the the Zaporizhizhia nuclear power plant.
So, what is the dictators playbook with these tools? Unleashing another nuclear catastrophe on Ukraine will almost certainly draw in NATO, and then quickly put an end to his regime. Does Putin value his regime survival? Or does he value burning it all down if he cannot have it? After last week, I lean heavily to the former. But also wonder if Putin will continue to badly miscalculate yet again?
Brian, I must go back and refamiliarize myself with that idea. But in looking forward, if dictators seems to miscalculate increasingly over time, this does not bode well for avoiding another nuclear disaster, and will widen the conflict.
Unfortunately one turkish pilot did not shoot erdogan plane down. Human factor weakness. And I guess he was killed by the dictators' goons. On top of lacking balls he lacked intelligence. Lol
Thoughtfully comprehensive and overtly pragmatic. I appreciate your even-handed approach to describing the nuances of this important subject. This coup could have affected all of us in very real and severe ways, and still may.
Thank you for reading, Pete!
Great piece! I am not sure Prigozhin's little endeavour has necessarily been a coup though. I am not an expert on coups specifically, but I would expect the necessary conditions of an event to be considered a coup to include the aim of toppling the leader. Of course, one of the defining traits of the Russian political system is its opacity and everything we can assume about Prigozhin's motives is speculation. This time though I think a stronger case can be made about Prigozhin acting defensively (the last months have been a constant chipping away at his powers as Wagner's leader both by Putin and the MoD) than offensively (his experience as a Kremlin insider allows him to estimate his chances in toppling Putin with some degree of accuracy. They were very low precisely because of many of the reasons you argue).
My case goes like this: if you extrapolate the current situation to other instances in which Putin has had to deal with overreaching oligarchs (e.g. Khodorkovsky), you can see the M.O. First, they take over the oligarch's business, then they move on to the punishment (murder, imprisonment...). Along the way they smear the target's reputation.
In that context from Prigozhin's PoV it makes sense to try to leverage the Wagner group before he loses control over the mercenaries. For power reasons, but also purely economical, Wagner is a very lucrative asset for Prigozhin. By launching a "freedom march", Prigozhin enters in an open (and very public) wrestle with the Kremlin in a very inconvenient time for the state, and specifically, for Putin. His myth is that of the one who ended the mob violence and street terror that the Yeltsin years brought upon the country. Every second of instability is chipping away at the legitimacy that steams from that. I do not think this can be overstated, any potential support for Putin, or his war from anyone in Russia requires that things at home are as peaceful and predictable as possible.
Therefore, Prigozhin assumes he will get away with keeping the Wagner group if he makes enough noise because Putin has to stop it on its tracks while avoiding violence—so it does not remind people of what is it like having people shooting each other on the streets.
The consequences (so far) for Prigozhin and the wagnerites have been somewhat mild. They were not met with force while moving towards Moscow and even now, seems like Prigozhin may be able to keep Wagner from Belarus. No one knows for sure. But the fact that Prigozhin spoke yesterday and Putin spoke twice already and there have been no mentions about what's going to happen with the mercenaries is at least, interesting. Of course they *can* join the Army, but they can also not as per what is public so far.
Of course, all this is merely a caveat, but I have always found that in thinking about Russia the capo di capi analogy is the one that reflects the reality the best. In this case (in which we lack key info) if we assume that that is how oligarchs perceive Putin, Prigozhin's actions (and words) make more sense. He was acting upon a beef that could go his way (against some other capos of the regime) rather than moving against the don himself. Which was a move that was almost guaranteed to fail.
Yes, it's impossible to know how to classify this properly. Many political violence experts might classify it as a mutiny, but it's very much in a grey area. It's impossible to know what his real intentions were.
In your wheelhouse, Brian. Well stated, clear, and not overreaching. I believe this mutiny/coup attempt/power play by Prigozhin will be a gift that keeps on giving. Perhaps the most damaging thing Evgeny Viktorovich did to Vladimir Vladimirovich was telling the truth about the endemic corruption as the reason for the invasion of Ukraine. It was about looting and plundering Ukrainian resources to satisfy the thirst of the oligarchy. Not nazis, not NATO, pure greed. Of course there would be side benefits such as squelching an emergent and vibrant democracy next door and feeding the vanity of the Chekist in chief as being oh so smart.
But what does your work say about dictators who overreach with foreign adventures? At every step of the way Putin has grossly miscalculated: strength and competence of his military and intelligence community, strength and resolve of Ukraine and its allies, pushing Finns and Swedes into NATO. The only tools he has is terror...missile attacks, blowing dams, and now the mining of the the Zaporizhizhia nuclear power plant.
So, what is the dictators playbook with these tools? Unleashing another nuclear catastrophe on Ukraine will almost certainly draw in NATO, and then quickly put an end to his regime. Does Putin value his regime survival? Or does he value burning it all down if he cannot have it? After last week, I lean heavily to the former. But also wonder if Putin will continue to badly miscalculate yet again?
Thanks, Paul! I wrote a bit about this here (before the invasion last year). It’s about the way that dictators miscalculate more the longer they’re in power; I call it the dictator trap and Putin fell into it. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/putin-dictator-trap-russia-ukraine/627064/
Brian, I must go back and refamiliarize myself with that idea. But in looking forward, if dictators seems to miscalculate increasingly over time, this does not bode well for avoiding another nuclear disaster, and will widen the conflict.
Unfortunately one turkish pilot did not shoot erdogan plane down. Human factor weakness. And I guess he was killed by the dictators' goons. On top of lacking balls he lacked intelligence. Lol